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SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

29 JANUARY 1970

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SURVEY

of Communist Propaganda

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29 JANUARY 1970
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SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

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EAST-WEST RELATIONS

FRG RELATIONS WITH THE BLOC: CONTINUED STRESS ON GDR PROPOSAL

East German and Soviet media continue to press for a treaty on establishment of relations between the two German states, while deploring alleged West German coolness toward a treaty between two "sovereign and equal" states. Concurrent attacks on aspects of West German policy center most notably on the FRG parliamentary meetings held in West Berlin from 19 to 27 January.* GDR Foreign Minister Winzer, in a speech on 22 January and in a NEUES DEUTSCHLAND article on the 24th endorsing the GDR's treaty proposal, rejects Bonn's stress on "inner-German settlements" as a plan for step-by-step preparations for "aggression."

Reporting on the 23d that Chancellor Brandt, in a letter to GDR Premier Stoph, had indicated readiness to open negotiations with the East German Government, ADN observes that the letter "does not contain any views on the GDR draft treaty" or "even mention" the draft. The ADN dispatch further complains that Brandt's letter fails to offer "any constructive suggestions" on the question of establishing normal relations between the FRG and GDR "based on equality and international law . . . , although it is generally known that the normalization of relations between the two German states requires recognition of the GDR on the basis of international law." A NEUES DEUTSCHLAND article the following day also notes the absence of any reference in the letter to the GDR draft treaty and goes on to argue at length against the FRG's "mystical concept of the so-called preservation of the German nation" which serves "to fan nationalism, this ideology of revanchism."

A 23 January TASS report of the Brandt letter repeats the ADN account almost verbatim, including the observation that the letter failed to mention the GDR's draft treaty. Other Soviet propaganda continues to be critical of Bonn's unwillingness to recognize the GDR. A participant in a domestic service commentators' roundtable show on 25 January, pointing up "contradictions" in Bonn's foreign policy, says that while the FRG has expressed a readiness for talks with

* For a discussion of Soviet and East German reaction to the meetings in West Berlin, see the FBIS TRENDS for 28 January 1970, page 21, and the FBIS SURVEY for 15 January 1970, pages 2-4.

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East Germany on renunciation of the use of force, it has indicated that "there can be no question of international legal recognition of the GDR." The commentator recalls Ulbricht's 19 January press conference in which he stated that agreements, including those on the renunciation of force, can be concluded only between states which recognize each other under international law. And in a foreign-language commentary on the 22d Glazunov observes that it is "contradictory and inconsistent" for Bonn to talk about the need to normalize relations with the GDR while remaining reluctant to recognize it as "an international legal subject."

FRG-SOVIET RELATIONS

Moscow continues to maintain its virtual silence on the FRG-Soviet talks on a non-use-of-force agreement which opened in Moscow in early December.* Consistent with this silence, monitored Soviet media have not mentioned the arrival of FRG representative Bahr in Moscow on 28 January. According to Hamburg's DPA, Bahr will head the West German delegation in the next round of talks with the USSR and will "probably" have his first meeting with Foreign Minister Gromyko on the 29th or 30th.

Despite the silence on the bilateral talks, Soviet propaganda has intimated that Bonn's policies could have a detrimental effect on its relations with the bloc, including the USSR. Thus a Mikhaylov article in PRAVDA on 23 January, touching briefly on the parliamentary meetings in West Berlin, says that these "provocative sorties are in blatant contradiction to assurances of the FRG Government about its strivings to help create a favorable atmosphere for meetings and negotiations" in Europe and can be viewed as attempts to hinder "practical steps" toward the creation of a system of collective security. A 27 January German-language commentary, adamant in its insistence that West Germany has no rights to West Berlin, concludes that all of the actions of the FRG "have naturally influenced the socialist countries and the peoples of Europe in their assessment of Bonn's policy."

* Soviet media have apparently acknowledged the talks only once, in a 25 December 1968 radio commentary in Mandarin reacting to Chinese charges of a "sellout" of the GDR. The commentary said that "negotiation between the Soviet Union and the FRG in Moscow was a routine thing following the birth of the new administration in Bonn."

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FRG-POLISH RELATIONS

In the period since 22 December, when Premier Cyrankiewicz revealed in a speech before the Sejm that a note on a possible exchange of views with the FRG would be delivered to Bonn,* Polish media have given minimal attention to the matter of relations with West Germany. PAP does report on 27 January, however, that "an exchange of views on political subjects" between Poland and the FRG will begin on 5 February in Warsaw. On the same day, Hamburg's DPA reports that FRG Foreign Minister Scheel said Warsaw had agreed to bilateral talks shortly before Christmas. DPA adds that "the Federal Government proceeds from the assumption that the Poles will attach very special importance to the subject of final recognition of the Oder-Neisse line."

Polish Foreign Minister Jedrychowski, in a 22 January article in the Moscow PRAVDA, had touched briefly on the matter of FRG-Polish relations, noting that Warsaw's December reply to a late-November FRG note "expresses agreement on setting about the exchange of opinions." Poland is waiting, Jedrychowski says, for "a confirmation of the realistic tendencies in the political activities of the new FRG Government, having an attentive and serious attitude toward them." The text of the Polish reply has not been released by Warsaw.

PAP on 25 January reported without comment the conclusion of a three-day visit to the FRG by Polish Foreign Trade Minister Burakiewicz. His talks with the FRG Minister of Economics, according to PAP, "were connected with the negotiations now under way on a new long-term trade agreement."

* The Cyrankiewicz speech is discussed in the FBIS SURVEY for 2 January 1970, pages 3-4.

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SOUTHEAST ASIA

SOUTH VIETNAM: NFLSV/PRG DELEGATIONS TOUR FOREIGN COUNTRIES

Several joint NFLSV/PRG "friendship delegations" have been touring abroad over the past several months in an apparent campaign to increase the prestige and status of the Provisional Revolutionary Government which was established last June. There have thus far been visits to all of the communist countries except Romania, Cuba, and Yugoslavia, and to all other countries which have recognized the PRG except Mali. Although Cambodia has not been included in the current round of visits, PRG President Huynh Tan Phat visited that country in early July.* Tanzania, Zambia, Guinea, India, and Somalia, which had not recognized the PRG, also received delegations, and it was subsequently announced--by LIBERATION PRESS AGENCY (LPA) on 22 January--that diplomatic relations had been established at embassy level with Tanzania. There were also announcements that diplomatic relations at embassy level were being established with several other countries which had previously recognized the PRG--Iraq, Mauritania, Sudan, and the Congo (B). While ambassadors have been named to all of the communist countries except Yugoslavia, appointments in the noncommunist countries have been confined to Algeria, Cambodia, and the UAR. Cuba remains the only country that is known to have named an ambassador to the PRG.

The various NFLSV/PRG delegations were headed by Nguyen Huu Tho, Chairman of the NFLSV Central Committee Presidium and of the PRG's Advisory Council; Tran Buu Kiem, Minister to the Chairman's Office and previously head of the NFLSV delegation at the Paris talks; Mme. Nguyen Thi Binh, PRG Foreign Minister and chief delegate at Paris; Le Quang Chanh, Deputy Foreign Minister; Nguyen Van Quang, "special envoy" of the PRG**; and Nguyen Van Tien, deputy delegation head at the Paris talks.

* Cambodia had promptly recognized the PRG on 14 June and Nguyen Van Hieu was subsequently accredited as the PRG ambassador. Phat's visit from 30 June to 5 July is discussed in the FBIS TRENDS of 2 July 1969, page 10, and of 9 July, page 8.

** Although Quang is the PRG Ambassador to the CPR he was not so identified in propaganda on his visits.

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Several of the visits, both to communist and noncommunist countries, were on the occasion of various national days. Thus, Nguyen Huu Tho was in Peking on the CPR's 1 October National Day and in Moscow on the 7 November October Revolution anniversary; Tran Buu Kiem was in the GDR on its 7 October National Day; and Mme. Nguyen Thi Binh was in Tirana on the 29 November Albanian National Day. Tran Buu Kiem also attended the revolution anniversary in Algeria, Le Quang Chanh the independence anniversary in South Yemen, and Nguyen Van Quang National Day in Mauritania.

The following table lists the various countries visited by each delegation, the dates of the visit, and the status of relations with each.

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DELEGATION HEAD, COUNTRY VISITED	DATES OF VISIT	DIPLOMATIC STATUS
<u>Nguyen Huu Tho*</u>		
CPR	29 Sept-16 Oct	Nguyen Van Quang, ambassador
USSR	3 - 22 Nov	Dang Quang Minh, ambassador
<u>Tran Buu Kiem**</u>		
GDR	3 - 12 Oct	Nguyen Nhu, ambassador
Hungary	12 - 17 Oct	Dinh Ba Thi, ambassador
Poland	17 - 22 Oct	Tran Van Tu, ambassador
Bulgaria	22 - 29 Oct	Huynh Phan, ambassador
Algeria	29 Oct-5 Nov	Pham Van Quang, ambassador
Syria	6 - 10 Nov	agreement to elevate NFLSV representation to PRG embassy reported 24 June; PRG repre- sented by charge d'affaires a.i.
UAR	10 - 17 Nov	Truong Binh, ambassador
Czechoslovakia	17 - 21 Nov	Hoang Minh Hoa, ambassador
DPRK	26 Nov-3 Dec	Vu Ngoc Ho, ambassador
Mongolia	3 - 8 Dec	Dang Quang Minh, ambassador
<u>Mme. Nguyen Thi Binh</u>		
Albania	26 Nov-1 Dec	Nguyen Xuan Long, ambassador
Hungary	1 - 4 Dec	(see Kiem delegation)

* The joint communiques on Tho's visits to the CPR and the USSR are discussed in the FBIS TRENDS of 22 October 1969, pages 12-13, and of 26 November, pages 7-9, respectively.

** From 17 to 23 December Kiem led a group of a "friendship visit" to the "liberated zone" of Laos as the guest of the NLHX Central Committee. See the FBIS TRENDS of 31 December, page 10.

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DELEGATION HEAD, COUNTRY VISITED	DATES OF VISIT	DIPLOMATIC STATUS
<u>Le Quang Chanh</u>		
Iraq	22 - 26 Nov	agreement to establish diplomatic relations reported 25 Nov
South Yemen	28 Nov-2 Dec	agreement to establish diplomatic relations reported 11 July
Sudan	5 - 8 Dec	agreement to establish diplomatic relations reported 8 Dec
Tanzania	19 - 25 Dec, reported as present on 5 Jan and on 20 Jan	agreement to establish diplomatic relations reported 22 Jan; Do Hang identified as charge d'affaires a.i.
Zambia	27 Dec-5 Jan	no recognition
Somalia	reported present 27 Jan	no recognition
<u>Nguyen Van Quang</u>		
Mauritania	22 - 29 Nov	agreement to establish diplomatic relations reported 3 Dec.
Guinea	1 - 5 Dec	no recognition
Congo (B)	10 - 15 Dec	agreement to establish diplomatic relations reported 16 Dec
<u>Nguyen Van Tien</u>		
India	13 Dec-8 Jan	no recognition
* * * * *		
<u>COUNTRIES NOT YET VISITED BY PRG</u>		
Romania		Nguyen Duc Van, ambassador
Cuba		Nguyen Minh Phuong, ambassador
Yugoslavia		recognition not known to have been acknowledged by PRG
Mali		no known reference to establishment of diplomatic relations

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CP ORGAN DISCUSSES ECONOMIC, FINANCIAL TASKS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

An unusual discussion of current and future tasks in the financial and economic sphere appears in a 22-24 January series of Liberation Radio broadcasts of an article identified as appearing in TIEN PHONG (VANGUARD), the journal of the People's Revolutionary Party, the communist party in South Vietnam. The radio identifies the issue simply as "No. 8" and gives no date.* The article claims that "despite fierce enemy operations we have succeeded in maintaining our rear's economic potential." But it stresses the need to "promptly meet the great material demands of the immediate military and political tasks" and to "positively prepare for the coming struggle phase." To fulfill the demands requires a heightened leadership responsibility, TIEN PHONG says, in the building of the rear areas and the limiting of the enemy's economic and financial "battleground."

Declaring that economic activities "in our zone and control over rural areas" must be strengthened, the article routinely asserts that a sound rear is necessary to win a war. And it says that along with "the great socialist rear in the North," we have "our rear base in the South, the vast rural area and Mekong River Delta." Emphasizing the importance of holding onto the rich food source in the delta in fighting the allies, it says that the economic struggle must be closely associated with the military and political struggle in the contested areas and near cities. The stepping up of food production and development of small self-sufficient industries are outlined as practical steps for strengthening positions.

Regarding financial tasks, the article says it is necessary to be thrifty and to combat usury. Thriftiness is said to be necessary to acquire sufficient production capital, and "squandering" and corruption must be fought. The importance of the interrelation of production, circulation, and distribution is also noted. Pointing out that resources must be exploited, the article also says that "localities must strictly refrain from automatically collecting and borrowing money from the people," and warns against the development of a "one-sided financial viewpoint lacking the mass viewpoint."

* The last time Liberation Radio is known to have broadcast material from TIEN PHONG was on 24 January 1969 when it carried an article, said to have been from the December 1968 issue, dealing with President-elect Nixon's outlook on Vietnam.

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The article shows concern regarding the circulation and organizing of supplies and the gradual overcoming of the situation in which the exchange of goods between "our rear areas has to be carried out through enemy controlled zones." It further notes that general production and circulation tasks should be better regulated in the Mekong Delta, eastern Nam Bo, and Zones 6 and 10.*

In preparation for the "future phase" of the struggle, the article says, it is necessary to conduct a "survey" assessing "our economic capabilities in various areas," and stimulate certain branches, so as to advance towards a self-sufficient economy in the South, and create material conditions for reestablishing economic relations between the North and South** and developing "our country's economic relations with other countries in the future."

* Public references to numbered Zones--or Region or Military Region--are rare. A recent, previous mention of a Zone designation over Liberation Radio, however, appeared in a 7 December 1969 broadcast on a heroes congress in central Nam Bo, which was referred to as Zone 2.

** While the basic objective of Vietnam unification is referred to frequently in the propaganda, references to North-South economic relations do not normally appear. However, the September 1967 NFSLV Political Program, in advocating the restoration of "normal" relations between the two zones, did say that pending reunification the people in both the North and South will "endeavor to expand economic and cultural exchanges."

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DRV MEDIA CONTINUE TO PUBLISH MILITARY ARTICLES BY "TRUC CHIEN"

As part of the year-end military reviews, QUAN DOI NHAN DAN and Hanoi radio on 4 and 5 January, respectively, carried an article attributed to "Truc Chien" (hand-to-hand-combat) on the U.S. clear-and-hold strategy. A flurry of articles by the same author has been broadcast throughout the month, with the last known one appearing on 24 January. The broadcasts have not consistently specified that the Truc Chien articles have been published in the army paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN; on the other hand, some of them have been broadcast as anonymous articles in the army paper, but Hanoi radio's press review then has indicated that articles with the same titles have been published which are attributed to Truc Chien.*

"HOT LESSONS OF 1969"

Since 19 January there has been a flurry of articles with the general heading "Hot Lessons Learned in 1969;" three of the five articles have been specifically attributed to Truc Chien. However, the initial article broadcast on the 19th under this heading was labeled an anonymous article in QUAN DOI NHAN DAN and, as Hanoi does not broadcast a press review every day, it is not possible to determine whether Truc Chien authored it.** Another military analysis is attributed to Truc Chien by a Hanoi broadcast on the 21st which does not term it a "hot lessons" article nor note that it was published in QUAN DOI NHAN DAN. This article reviews the destruction of allied materiel in 1969.

* The initial Truc Chien article is discussed in the FBIS TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA of 7 January 1970, pages 4-5. The FBIS SURVEY of 15 January, pages 6-8, discusses some of the subsequent ones. The first paragraph on page six incorrectly indicates that the articles broadcast on the 10th and 11th were in the papers of the 7th and 8th; they were published on the 8th and 9th. There was an article by Truc Chien in the 7 January QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, broadcast the same day anonymously. The article attacked the ineffectiveness of General Abrams' defense-in-depth strategy, claiming that the Americans cannot be sure that even their safest bases like Tan Son Nhut are out of range, and that they have failed in their attempts to drive the war from the cities.

** This article is discussed in the FBIS TRENDS of 21 January, page 11.

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Hanoi radio on the 20th broadcasts another "hot lessons" article referred to as being published in QUAN DOI NHAN DAN but with no date. Discussing the combination of small-, medium-, and large-scale battles, the article claims that all kinds of attacks were launched continuously against inner and outer lines, causing heavy allied casualties and materiel losses. It quotes on this point the PLAF 17th communique of 31 December, which claims that no month or week elapsed without the allies speculating on a new wave of attacks and no month passed in which the allies could avoid serious blows.

The article describes the interrelationship of the attacks: The guerrilla and self-defense forces' small-scale, continuous, widespread attacks create conditions and opportunities for regional and regular forces' large-scale ones. The large-scale blows of the regulars are said to then create conditions for regional and guerrilla forces to enlarge their strength. The article claims that the guerrillas have "most extensively" mobilized people fighting and use all weapons "including those seized from the enemy." The article asserts that the allies have had to cope with small- and medium-scale attacks while constantly worrying about the large ones. It concludes by declaring that the PLAF has overcome unspecified "difficulties," thus creating conditions for launching large-scale attacks.

The three other "hot lessons" articles which are attributed to Truc Chien are broadcast by Hanoi on the 22d, 23d, and 24th. The article on the 22d is said to be "a continuation" of an article by the author published in a "recent" QUAN DOI NHAN DAN. It is not clear whether the broadcast means merely that it is a continuation of the "hot lessons" discussion. The article deals with "the coordination of annihilating allied troops and frustrating their strategic plans." It points out that it is necessary to skillfully choose direction, bases, and targets of the offensive and to know how to deploy and use forces. The 1969 "victories," says the article, show recognition of the importance of "annihilation." The article also deals with "the blows at the tools of Vietnamization"--the ARVN forces. And it describes the "special importance" attached to attacks on ARVN training centers and schools, and to disintegrating militia and civil defense forces, since the allies have formed these forces to "attack and destroy the revolutionary bases." Stopping short

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of the claim that the pacification policy was defeated in 1969,* the article says that "the 1969 battlefield showed" that only by foiling pacification can the liberated areas be strengthened and maintained and allied resources halted, thus eliminating the GVN's "foothold" in the rural areas.

The Truc Chien article broadcast by Hanoi radio on the 23d is published in the QUAN DOI NHAN DAN of the 20th, according to Hanoi radio's press review. It says an excellent communist tactic of 1969 was "countering enemy encroachments along with executing deep thrusts into his defense lines." It adds that 1969 showed that the two combat practices must be coordinated. These thrusts have been a constant threat to the allies, says Truc Chien, prompting them to use a large force to protect their important positions. As in the article on the 22d, Truc Chien asserts that deep thrusts have been made into ARVN centers, such as "open arms" units and police services.

Hanoi radio on the 24th broadcasts another of the "hot lessons" articles by Truc Chien which is also identified as having been published in a "recent" QUAN DOI NHAN DAN; the Hanoi press review indicates it was in the paper on the 22d. Discussing political as well as military aspects of the struggle, he says that only when the political forces of the masses are developed and consolidated can "we have steadfast bases for developing and stepping up guerrilla activities." To develop guerrilla warfare, he says, the aim of closely combining combat with building forces must be understood.

Truc Chien asserts that the building of "militia and guerrilla forces must be aimed at effectively serving the regional combat task." If they are only built and do not engage in combat they will "not be trained" and they may become passive. Truc Chien points out that "in many areas" the struggle movement continued to develop, showing that these localities closely combined combat and construction. And he clearly indicates that the struggle movement has not been consistent when he calls for a "review of various waves of struggle against the enemy" to discover who fought staunchly.

* A Liberation Radio commentary on the 16th says that pacification is "being fragmented" although it "can occasionally create certain difficulties for our compatriots."

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Truc Chien goes on to review guerrilla achievements, including undermining Vietnamization. This, claims Truc Chien, safeguards the revolutionary forces whom the guerrillas rely on to develop the revolutionary military forces. He states that "in areas where they fight" the regular and regional forces must "not only cooperate with local militiamen and guerrillas, but also help them build and develop the local guerrilla force" by training cadres and improving equipment and political education.

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YUGOSLAVIA

CROATIAN PLENUM DEBATE REFLECTS RISING TENSIONS IN LCY

Resurgence of the perennial issue of republic nationalism and rising tensions between party advocates of more republic autonomy and "conservative" forces which want greater Federal centralization were underlined in the Croatian party Central Committee's recent decision to discipline Dr. Milos Zanko for alleging that nationalism is on the rise in Croatia.

Zanko, a party Central Committee member and a vice president of the Federal Assembly, leveled his charges in a series of BORBA articles published 17-21 November 1969. The plenum, alleging that these articles caused "grave confusion and dilemmas" in the party, censured Zanko at its 15-17 January meeting for acting "contrary to the policy of the League of Communists of Croatia" and for trying "to discredit and divide its leadership." Since Zanko refused to accept the Croatian party's criticism, the plenum, according to Radio Zagreb on the 17th, decided that he could no longer continue to be a permanent member of the conference of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. He had been elected a permanent member at the Sixth Croatian Party Congress on 7 December 1968.

As reported in Yugoslav media, the plenum debate on the Zanko incident, in which 70 speakers participated, was notable for the fact that Croatia's two representatives in the Yugoslav Executive Bureau defended the disciplining of Zanko and viewed "unitarianism" rather than republic nationalism as the main danger in Yugoslav society. For those who advocate the decentralization of political power and the devolution of economic power to the enterprises, "unitarianism" has become a synonym for bureaucratic centralism which smacks of neo-Stalinism.

The accounts of the plenum debates indicate that Zanko was labeled a front man for "conservative" elements seeking to use the nationalist issue to reassert greater Federal control over the republics and to sabotage self-management. Thus, Croatian Central Committee member Blazevic, Radio Zagreb reported on the 16th, charged that "Zanko is the protagonist of those aspirations and trends in the League of Communists which stem from unitarist positions." Similarly, Radio Zagreb quoted Croatian party leader Dr. Savka Dabcevic-Kucar as stating in her report to the plenum that "it is obvious that the Zanko articles are an expression of the conservative bureaucratic

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forces which oppose this leadership." Zanko's charges that nationalism was getting out of control, she argued, constituted a blatant attempt to interfere in the Croatian party's internal affairs: "Nobody has the right, apart from what is allowed under the statute of the League of Communists, to seek intervention from outside the legal leadership; and this, in a way, is what was implied in these articles." Assailing Zanko for exaggerating the nationalist danger in Croatia, she went on to picture a conflict between opposing outlooks, of which "unitarianism" was the "most dangerous":

As far as the reform program is concerned, there are various attitudes and pressures of which the most dangerous are the ones that try to turn us back. One attitude is the course to implement the reform, the struggle for self-management and the struggle for new relations in the federation; the other is the fear that this leads to disintegration, the tendency to turn back, and unitarianism as a way out. In this struggle bureaucratic forces do not refrain from crude attempts to disavow the progressive forces.

The unity of the Croatian party leadership on the Zanko question was underlined in speeches delivered by Federal Executive Bureau members Tripalo and Bakaric, who supported the Croatian party leader's views and reaffirmed the republic party's right to manage its own affairs. Tripalo, according to Radio Zagreb, stressed that "the plenum debate did not represent a struggle for power but opposition to unitarian and bureaucratic-statist concepts, the advocates of which are using factionalist methods." Terming Zanko's charges of nationalism exaggerated, Tripalo concluded that the Croatian party "is the most competent to deal with any manifestations of nationalism in the republic." Bakaric, after expressing similar sentiments, endorsed Dr. Savka Dabcevic-Kucar's view in remarking that unitarianism was the "really" dangerous tendency "in the Yugoslav community."

In her closing speech to the plenum, reported by Radio Zagreb on the 17th, Dr. Dabcevic-Kucar stated that after a talk was held with Zanko, he still refused to accept the Central Committee's political assessment of the situation and criticism of his activities. Hinting that if Zanko does not mend his ways he may be ousted from the party, she concluded that after thinking about the Central Committee's criticism "he may find a way to avoid a final break with the course of the League of Communists." Zanko's failure to recant, however, appears to indicate that he feels he has sufficient party support to maintain his divisive position.

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REVISED CPSU HISTORY AMPLIFIES RULE OF OLIGARCHY

The recently published third edition of "The History of the CPSU," which has received wide publicity in the West for the way in which it has muted criticism of Stalin and the Stalin era, also sheds new light on the configuration of power in the Soviet hierarchy. The authoritative text not only sanctions the continued division of power between party and government at the highest levels of the regime, but at the same time appreciably strengthens the formulations on collective leadership. The new work also pays unusual attention to the policy-making prerogatives of the CPSU Politburo during recent years.

Although Brezhnev receives greater attention in the new work than any of his colleagues, he shares the spotlight with other leaders, particularly Kosygin and Podgornyy, when important official occasions are mentioned. Moreover, Brezhnev conspicuously fails to receive the kind of accolades bestowed on Khrushchev in the second (1962) edition of the party history. The image of Brezhnev projected in the revised history is that of the regime's principal spokesman rather than initiator of policy or inspirational leader.

Sanction for High-Level Division of Power Is Evident

The determination of Khrushchev's successors to prevent a recurrence of one-man rule is clearly evident in the revised party history. It appears, first, in the form of criticism of Khrushchev's assumption of the post of premier in March 1958 while still occupying the post of party first secretary. "Life showed," according to the new work, "that such a combination of the two highest posts in one person was inexpedient and unwarranted. It led to an excessive concentration of power in the hands of one person, as a result of which violation of the principle of collectivity in work and subjectivism in the solution of a number of questions were observed." Ironically, while passing judgment on Khrushchev, the text fails to criticize Stalin for his occupancy of the same posts.

The new text subsequently discloses that the October 1964 CPSU plenum which deposed Khrushchev "recognized the inexpediency in the future of combining in one person the duties of First Secretary of the Central Committee and Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers." Although an

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identical disclosure was made three years ago in Georgian party secretary P.A. Rodionov's book "Collectivity--The Highest Principle of Party Leadership," this is the first time such a statement has appeared in an authoritative party publication. A public disclosure of this kind, issued more than five years after Khrushchev's fall, clearly points to the continued determination of the oligarchy to avoid the pitfalls of one-man rule.

Formulas on Collective Leadership Are Strengthened

This same determination is evident in certain new and revised formulations on collective leadership in the party history. The recent changes are all the more noteworthy since they point to a steady progression of emphasis on collectivity since the appearance of the first edition of the party history in 1959. Thus, the pointed warnings against one-man rule introduced in the second (1962) edition reappear in the latest edition, along with even stronger affirmations of collective leadership.

The most extensive changes in this regard occur in the treatment of the purge of Beria in 1953. For example, one of the new formulations in the text is drawn from the 10 July 1953 PRAVDA editorial on the purge, which was directly addressed to the highest echelons of the power structure:

Any official, whatever post he occupies, must be under the unrelenting control of the party. Party organizations must regularly check the work of all organizations and departments and the activity of all leading officials. It is also necessary to take under systematic and unrelenting control the activity of the organs of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

Another change in this section involving a definition of the principle of collectivity reads as follows:

This principle requires from each official of a leading party organ observance of the Leninist norms of party life, respect for collective opinion and subordination to the will of the majority, and full justification by one's activity of the high trust shown by the party.

In still another revision, the new text reiterates a passage on collective leadership from the 1962 edition of the party history, but emphasizes the message by italicizing the phrase "principle of collectivity" in the passage.

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The emphasis on collectivity is also evident in the treatment of more recent events--the October 1964 CPSU plenum and the 23d CPSU Congress--not covered in earlier editions of the history. It even finds expression in the conclusions that comprise the last 20 pages of the voluminous tome. Where the old text affirmed that "the party consistently observes the Leninist norms of party life and principles of party leadership," the new text sharpens the formulation by substituting the word "strictly" for "consistently."

Brezhnev's Stature in Collective Remains Slight

In line with the emphasis on collectivity, the new party history is sparing in its references to Khrushchev's successors and miserly in its dispensation of praise. Thus, in its general coverage of the post-Khrushchev period, the history refers more frequently to Brezhnev (16 times) than to Kosygin (5) and Podgornyy (3), but the vast majority of these references relate to Brezhnev's speeches at party gatherings rather than to any other accomplishment on his part. Moreover, on important official occasions, such as the 23d Congress, the 50th anniversary commemoration, and the June 1969 international communist conference, Brezhnev invariably shares the spotlight with other leaders, particularly Kosygin and Podgornyy. Even the inclusion of Brezhnev's name in a listing of "prominent" wartime leaders is offset by a new reference to Kosygin's wartime services.

The current treatment of Brezhnev contrasts sharply with that accorded Khrushchev in the 1962 edition of the party history. Unlike Brezhnev, Khrushchev was credited with major policy initiatives which completely overshadowed the records of his contemporaries. This accreditation has been withdrawn from the new history, along with the countless citations from Khrushchev's speeches and most of the references to his activities.

Part of the vacuum created by these revisions is now filled with occasional references to unidentified "other leaders" and to the collective institutions of power--"the CPSU Central Committee and its Politburo." In particular, the activities of the Politburo in the field of foreign affairs are now singled out for special attention in the new history, through the device of recalling the occasional endorsements of those activities by Central Committee plenums. The apparent enhancement of the Politburo's status is even reflected in the current treatment of the purge of Beria. The new party history credits the CPSU Presidium--predecessor of the Politburo--with the exposure of Beria, whereas the 1962 edition gave the credits to Khrushchev, for initiating the action, and to the Central Committee, for carrying it out.

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COMMUNIST CHINA

PARTY MEMBERS ARE SET APART FROM MASSES, PROPAGANDISTS SAY

The thesis that the party is superior to all other organizations in Communist China, seldom spelled out during the cultural revolution, has come increasingly to the fore in recent weeks. There have been at the same time scattered but progressively more numerous assertions that party members as well as the party organization must be set apart from the masses--the antithesis of the revolutionary view that the ordinary worker is just as likely, perhaps more likely, to be able to grasp Mao's thought than the party member.

An article in the first issue of RED FLAG for 1970, belatedly broadcast by Radio Peking on 22 January, provided central authority for placing party members in a special category. Tying the thesis to Mao's dictum that class struggle will continue as long as classes continue to exist, the article implied that Mao's authority also supports the view that there must be a distinction between advanced and ordinary members of the proletariat and a further distinction between party members and nonmembers. The article explained that the notion that "the time when party members and the masses are equal is over" rests on a misunderstanding. It is not a question of an era being "over," RED FLAG indicates, because the notion of "absolute equality in politics" never did hold sway during the cultural revolution--although of course one must not divorce oneself from the masses nor feel that the masses are backward.

Shanghai radio, which has actively promoted the dictum of party leadership over other organizations, is the only public source to discuss at any length the problems faced by nonparty cadres under conditions of a revival of party primacy. A newsletter broadcast on 25 January referred to a new cadre who was faced with the question "How should we nonparty cadres continue our work of revolution?" He mistakenly concluded that the party would take over revolutionary committee responsibilities and he could go back to the workshop. He soon realized his error, however, and then actively helped form the new party committee. Another new cadre mentioned in the newsletter helped break down mass organizational factionalism, again illustrating the continued usefulness of the newer nonparty cadres.

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Proper Function of Revolutionary Committee Remains Issue

The relationship between the party organ and the revolutionary committee is that between the leader and the led, it has been clearly stated. Yet the new functions of the revolutionary committee seem still to be subject to misunderstanding and differences of view.

A 23 January editorial in HUNAN DAILY, reiterating that the party must lead both the army and the government, warned that the party committee must not monopolize revolutionary committee work lest it "become embroiled in affairs" and progressively weaken "the unified leadership of the party." The editorial, which also warned against the dangers posed by those who place mass organizations above the party organizations, indicates that even the party's prestige is insufficient to heal organizational rivalry without scars and that unity is best served by putting the party somewhat above the battle.

There is some risk to the authority of party leadership under the circumstances of mere indirect party control, however, as indicated by a Honan broadcast on 13 January. The radio reported on a situation in which some leadership cadres failed to treat the party-revolutionary committee relationship correctly "so that the party was unable to play its proper role as the core." The chairman of the revolutionary committee recognized the danger, it was said, and stated that "if the party leadership core were weakened within the revolutionary committee there would be a danger that the revolutionary regime would become a revolutionary regime in name only." Nanking radio on the 23d seemed to recognize this problem also; it called on all party organs to "oppose the practice of allowing each unit to go its own way" by strengthening the party concept.

The length of time devoted to party building with still no end in sight stands as testimony to the problems faced by the regime in adopting measures which will revive the vitality of the party without in effect risking another revolution by suddenly destroying the administrative fabric that has run the country for the past three years. Chengchow radio tried to explain away some of the difficulties in establishing new party structures by blaming them on incorrect party building which "was conducted before the ninth party congress and is very far from meeting the demands of the new party constitution"--not a very convincing explanation, because the draft constitution, nearly identical to the final version, was made available as a guide in November 1968.

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It is likely that the new structure, in which the party seems to exercise no separate administrative power, accentuates a problem evident in the pre-cultural revolution setup. In that structure, with more precise party-government distinctions, many government cadres exercised considerable power although they had little prestige, while ordinary party members had the prestige but little power. The current party-revolutionary committee system, in which administrative power is exercised by the revolutionary committee headed by the local party leaders, contains the seeds for a significant dichotomy between power and prestige. Nonparty members who occupy revolutionary committee posts will continue to exercise authority on a day-to-day basis while many party members working as ordinary workers will exercise scant authority of any sort, giving them little return for their added responsibility to maintain far higher standards of personal conduct.

T O P I C S I N B R I E F

BIRTH CONTROL

Shanghai radio has proclaimed the period 25-31 January a "shock week" for the propagation of birth control, encouragement of late marriage, and improvement in sanitation. Tsingtao city and Kiangsi province have announced similar spring health and sanitation campaigns, but with no reference to birth control or late marriage. Shanghai has been the only area to do any serious propagandizing in behalf of birth control, in public media, since the onset of the cultural revolution; injunctions to marry late have been a little more widespread, but here too Shanghai has been easily the most outspoken. Although they do not explicitly draw the connection, the Shanghai authorities may hope that some young people in Shanghai will find the prospect of earlier marriage and additional offspring an inducement to proceed willingly to the countryside and a peasant life.

ANTIRELIGIOUS PROPAGANDA

Propaganda efforts against religious survivals, seldom mentioned in public media in recent years, were discussed in Changsha (Hunan) radio broadcasts on 16-17 January. One report told how a brigade party branch, working in a largely minority area, had "extensively propagated atheism" among the peasants, in the course of discouraging a revival of traditional weddings and funerals. The other report described efforts to wipe out "superstitions" among peasants in suburban Changsha, including belief in God and reliance on "extravagant" weddings.

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